Tags: Point-By-Point EssaySubmit Research PaperCentrifugal Pump Lab ReportWriiten Essays For ScholarsCritical Thinking In Social StudiesThesis Theme Remove S
Moreover, it has invested huge amounts of economic and political capital in the project, defying the predictions of experts who doubted its capability to develop a sophisticated nuclear arsenal and gaining international clout as a result.This raises a question: If North Korea is highly unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons, why does the United States continue to demand this?
The ultimate goal of this coercive campaign, Trump administration officials have made clear, is the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.
In recent weeks, North Korea announced a willingness to begin negotiations and suspend nuclear and missile tests in the interim, and President Trump agreed to hold a summit with Kim Jong Un, ostensibly to discuss denuclearization.
Instead of threatening preventive war and raising the risks of dangerous miscalculation, why doesn’t Washington accept the fact that North Korea has nuclear weapons and focus on deterring the regime from using them, achieving limits on the size or sophistication of the arsenal, or reducing the risk of conflict on the Peninsula?
Much of the answer to this question lies in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT, the cornerstone of contemporary efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
North Korea’s apparent demand for security guarantees as its price for denuclearization also raises red flags, as Pyongyang has in the past asked for the withdrawal of U. forces from South Korea—an almost certain deal breaker. Perhaps the biggest reason to doubt that the North Korean regime will give up its nuclear weapons is the fact that it views its arsenal as the ultimate guarantee of regime survival.
Indeed, the experience of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi after dismantling their WMD programs suggests that Pyongyang would be prudent to maintain its nuclear deterrent in order to defend against potential threats from the United States.Since the 1970s, the United States has added teeth to the nonproliferation regime by enacting legislation that mandates sanctions on countries that pursue or acquire nuclear weapons outside the NPT.At least when it comes to preventing additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons, there is substantial evidence that the treaty has succeeded—by creating norms against developing nuclear weapons, mitigating security dilemmas between rival states, and facilitating the aforementioned coercive enforcement measures by the United States and others.He has been Professor of Government at the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1969-77, and is the co-author of Power and Interdependence and a contributor to Nuclear Power Issues and Choices: Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group (the Ford-Mitre Report cited in footnote 3 below).During his election campaign, Jimmy Carter dramatized a broad but inchoate popular concern when he promised that curbing the spread of nuclear weapons would be among his highest foreign policy priorities.*** For close to a year now, the Korean Peninsula has teetered on the brink of war.As North Korea has made dramatic strides in its nuclear and missile programs, the Trump administration has orchestrated increasingly potent U. sanctions against Pyongyang and repeatedly threatened to launch a preventive attack.The essays gathered here show that attitudes on nonproliferation depend on a “complex, contingent decision calculus,” as states continually gauge how their actions within the regime will affect trade, regional standing, and other interests vital to any nation.The first four essays take theoretical approaches to such topics as a framework for understanding challenges to collective action; clandestine proliferation under the Bush and Obama administrations and its impact on regime legitimacy; threat construction as a lens through which to view resistance to nonproliferation measures; and the debate over the relationship between nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.This is the first book-length study of why states sometimes ignore, oppose, or undermine elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime—even as they formally support it.Anchored by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear nonproliferation regime is the constellation of agreements, initiatives, and norms that work in concert to regulate nuclear material and technology.